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Dean Eastman: 
Again, if I could have your attention.  For those of you that 
don’t know me, my name is John Eastman.  I’m the Dean here at 
Chapman University School of Law for about twelve more hours.  
Let me take this opportunity to really acknowledge Kasey 
Phillips; she’s done a phenomenal job organizing this symposium. 
I would also like to thank the whole Editorial Board of Law 
Review; you all have been working very hard and I know you’re 
going to be looking forward to some long sleep tomorrow—but not 
quite yet.  Also, Donald Kochan and Ron Rotunda, the faculty 
advisors to the Law Review.  They both deserve a round of 
applause as well. 
Secretary Chertoff became Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security on February 15, 2005, and he served until the 
very end of the Bush Administration in that capacity.  Now, he’s 
had a rather extraordinary career prior to that.  He served as a 
Circuit Judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeal.  He was 
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at the 
Department of Justice.  As Assistant Attorney General, he helped 
trace the 9/11 Terrorist Attack of the Al-Qaeda Network. 
Before joining the Bush Administration, Secretary Chertoff 
was a partner with the law firm of Latham and Watkins.  From 
1994 to 1996, he served as Special Counsel for the United States 
Senate Whitewater Committee.  After that, he spent more than a 
decade as a Federal Prosecutor, including serving as United 
States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, First Assistant 
U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, and Assistant U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York.  As United 
States Attorney, he investigated and prosecuted significant cases 
of political corruption and worked on crime and corporate fraud.  
Secretary Chertoff, as a prosecutor, I suspect that the next 
Attorney General of the State might be calling on you for advice. 
Secretary Chertoff graduated magna cum laude from 
Harvard College in 1975—we’d like to consider or call Harvard 
the Chapman University of the East Coast—and magna cum 
laude from Harvard Law School in 1978.  He also served as a law 
clerk for Supreme Court Justice William Brennan from 1979 to 
1983.  Please join me in welcoming Secretary Chertoff. 
Secretary Chertoff: 
I hope I didn’t chase the Dean out of office.  For those of you 
who believe in cause and effect analysis, I show up and then 
twelve hours later you leave.  So, I wish you the best of luck in 
public service and your campaign.  It’s a great privilege and a 
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great job.  It’s also a great responsibility, and it’s important that 
people still want to get into the fray.  These days are more and 
more difficult an environment for everybody. 
So I thought I’d talk about the nexus between terrorism and 
the international drug traffic in organized crime, largely because, 
of course, this is a conference about drug wars, and this happens 
to be an area where there’s a great drug war happening.  We 
have a tendency to say everything is war, the war on poverty, the 
war on drugs, the war on this—but some of these areas really do 
have a war.  There’s repeated violence and destruction, and when 
we look at the intersection between terrorism and international 
drug trafficking, I think we really do have a war.  So, what I 
thought I’d do is give you a little bit of a sense of change from the 
beginning of this decade through the next decade.  I’ll tell you 
right up front, I’m not recommending legalizing drugs.  I think 
that would be a major mistake. 
I first looked at the nexus between drug trafficking and 
terrorism when I was head of the Criminal Division at the 
Department of Justice.  Some of you may remember that the 
FARC, the Revolutionary Army in Colombia, which was a left 
wing political organization, was very strong in the 1990s and the 
early part of this decade.  It has lost a considerable amount of 
ground since then, partly because of our work with President 
Uribe of Colombia and his people in really reforming the military 
and pushing back against the FARC.  But certainly they remain 
a potent force, and they were very potent in the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s. 
We brought a series of indictments against the FARC for 
various terrorism-related violations which included, among other 
things, kidnapping people—including Americans—and holding 
them for ransom.  But one of the things that emerged as we 
investigated was that the FARC had begun to migrate toward 
becoming a classic drug organization.  What happened first was 
they began to encounter drug traffickers in the areas of Columbia 
that they controlled, and then they began to charge them a tax or 
a protection fee.  This is similar to what organized crime often 
does in the United States.  They don’t directly engage in the sale 
of drugs, but they essentially reap the benefits by extorting 
money from the drug dealers, or taxing them and protecting 
them against being ripped off. 
So the FARC began to move into the protection racket, but 
pretty soon that migrated into something a little bit more 
enabling.  They’d be involved in managing staging areas, helping 
load airplanes, and ultimately they became full-fledged partners 
in drug trafficking.  And, in fact, we had indictments issued 
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against the FARC that included both terrorism and drug 
trafficking charges.  In many ways, that was the first concrete 
example of the intersection between a global criminal 
organization involved in the drug trade—one that has access to 
the modern tools of money, movement, communications, and 
travel—with terrorist organizations who benefit from the money 
and the enabling capabilities of the drug organizations, and who 
can provide violence and the support of violence, which of course 
is important for the drug organizations. 
We’ve now seen this problem migrate from Colombia around 
the world.  It’s no secret in Afghanistan, for example, where the 
cultivation of poppies creates a major source for heroin.  It’s no 
secret that the Taliban has protected and, in fact, is cooperating 
with drug dealers, because they receive money from the drug 
dealing and the drug trafficking.  That money enables them to 
buy arms and, not coincidentally, the drug activity winds up also 
hurting the West and the enemies of the Taliban, so they get a 
double bang for their buck.  They have the ability both, in some 
general sense, to strike at their enemies and, in a more specific, 
narrow sense, to get the kinds of financing that they need in 
order to acquire the weapons and trading capabilities which 
allow them to be such lethal adversaries. 
What we’ve now seen, however, is that this is moving into 
South America, as well in places apart from Colombia.  For 
example, recent information tells us that there has been an 
increase in the movement of cocaine from South America into 
Europe.  That’s partly a reflection of some of the progress we’ve 
made in making it more difficult to bring drugs into the United 
States.  Partly, it’s a rise in demand in Europe, but what’s 
interesting, for the purpose of my talk, is how it’s getting there.  
And the way a lot of it is getting there is via North Africa.  The 
cocaine moves out of South America, often through Venezuela, 
where, of course, Hugo Chavez is really a dedicated enemy of the 
United States and the West and, therefore, very happy to be in a 
neighborhood of drug trafficking.  It then moves from Venezuela 
into North Africa, where it is staged and ultimately sent into 
Europe to be sold. 
What we have learned is that in North Africa, groups 
affiliated with terrorism, including Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb 
(which is a North African group that is sympathetic and, in fact, 
formally linked with the core Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan), have become involved in protecting the loads when 
they arrive and while they’re being held in staging to be 
ultimately shipped into Europe.  And the reason for that, again, 
is perfectly obvious, because it’s a source of money which enables 
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them to recruit and buy arms and further their own political 
goals.  So, once again, we begin to see the capabilities of drug 
organizations, and the money they generate, to create an 
attractive partner for terrorist organizations.  Terrorist organ-
izations also have the ability to provide the violence and the 
security that is very important to the drug traffickers. 
What I predict is going to happen is, at some point, some 
trafficker is going to look in the mirror and say: “You know, I’m 
not a drug trafficker.  I’m a political insurgent.”  We’re very close 
to having that cross-over of political ideology, no matter how far-
fetched it is, beginning to engraft itself into the violence and the 
mayhem that is part of the drug trade.  That, of course, is going 
to bring two dangerous adversaries together in a way which is 
only going to multiply the problems for those of us around the 
world who are trying to protect society. 
Where this might touch this country most seriously is in 
Northern Mexico.  I know people in California know this, but it’s 
not that well-known in other parts of the country—there’s 
currently nothing less than a war going on in Northern Mexico 
for the control and governance of the country.  It is underway 
because the President of Mexico has done a courageous thing—he 
has recognized that tolerating the rule of drug organizations in 
various cities in Northern Mexico is not an acceptable alternative 
for a modern democracy.  You cannot surrender parts of your 
country to organized crime or narcotics trafficking gangs.  And so 
he made it his top priority when he came into office several years 
ago to take these groups on. 
Not surprisingly, when you strike at organized criminal 
groups, they strike back.  And the tactics that they’ve adopted in 
many of the cartels in Northern Mexico are directly derived from 
what they have seen on television or over the Internet in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  We have beheadings.  We have kidnappings.  
We have bombings.  We have torture.  All the things that Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban have done are now being used by these 
organized crime cartels. 
The reason is quite explicit.  It is to terrorize the population 
of Mexico so that either this President at some point will be 
forced to pull back, or when the next election comes, it is more 
likely to go to somebody who is either tacitly or overtly willing to 
make peace with the cartels.  That would be a disaster for the 
United States.  It would be the equivalent of putting Waziristan 
on our southern border.  It’s one of the reasons that, when I was 
Secretary, we put into effect a process of contingency planning 
against the remote—but nevertheless certainly not un-
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thinkable—possibility that we might have an increase in cross-
border violence coming from Mexico into the United States. 
The short answer here, of course, is to support President 
Calderon in his effort.  It’s one of the reasons that President 
Bush pushed very hard for an initiative to send not only money 
but weapons, training, and modern technology to Mexico to help 
the Mexicans ramp up their own ability to fight the drug gangs.  
This policy is continuing into the current administration, which 
is also firmly committed to supporting Mexico in this endeavor.  
But, again, I want to put before you the notion that if one of these 
drug leaders one day decides that rather than thinking of himself 
as a thug, he’d rather think of himself as a political leader, we 
will have completed that merger between terrorism and 
organized criminality, which I think we’ve seen in its incipient 
phases in various places of the world. 
It would be hard to complete this tour of the world and 
where we are with respect to terrorism, organized crime, and 
organized drug dealing without again returning to Venezuela.  
Venezuela is, in many ways, the laboratory for what I think we’re 
going to see in the twenty-first century: Nation-states that bring 
together all the various strands that have posed security threats 
to people around the world, whether they be in the West or in 
Asia or in Africa.  We know, for example, that Chavez tolerates, if 
not directly facilitates, a drug activity which then, of course, 
becomes passed on either to the United States or to Europe.  We 
know that Chavez has embraced terrorism—he has close 
relationships with Hezbollah and Iran.  He’s increased the 
frequency of flights back and forth, and he has certainly 
facilitated the penetration of Iran and Hezbollah into Latin 
America. 
Interestingly, about a year ago, I was told by a prosecutor 
investigating a Magistrate in Argentina who was investigating 
terrorist bombings in the 1990s that, as far back as the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979, Iran had planted and sought to inject into 
South America terrorist operatives, Hezbollah operatives, in 
order to build some kind of an internal network in South 
America, which they could use to further the aims of Hezbollah 
and their own revolutionary goals.  So this idea of bringing 
together terrorism in South Asia and the Middle East and 
merging it with the activities going on in South America is not a 
new idea, but I would say that Chavez has really elevated the 
profiling and the level of mischief to an unparalleled height. 
So that is the world I think that we’re in, and it’s one that 
has some very serious implications for where we go in the future.  
And, the question for us is, how do we deal with this?  There are 
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several elements to a strategy, but the over-arching point is that 
we are no longer in an era where the wars that we fight are 
simply wars between nation-states.  Since the seventeenth 
century, wars have been conceived of as the kind of conflict that 
only occurs between countries.  That’s a product of some of the 
treaty-making that occurred in the middle of the last millennium.  
It’s also a product of the fact that we’ve all grown accustomed to 
our historical study of conflict as being that between nation 
states.  I think, in the twenty-first century and in this 
millennium, we’re going to see something quite different.  War is 
going to involve not only state against state, but network against 
state and network against network.  That is the configuration of 
modern society enabled by the communications, travel, and 
financial tools which make up globalization. 
Another element that is more and more evident is the 
significance of ungoverned space in the globe, because what we 
see now is that there are many states that do not actually fully 
control the domain over which they have formal authority.  We 
see it in Afghanistan.  We see it in Pakistan.  We see it in 
Somalia.  We see it in Yemen.  We see it even in certain parts of 
South America.  And with the leverage the technology, travel, 
communications, and global finance bring to smaller and smaller 
groups, these ungoverned spaces are no longer merely a domestic 
law enforcement problem for the state in which they reside.  
They are now a global problem because ungoverned space 
becomes a platform from which people train, experiment, recruit, 
and ultimately launch attacks against the rest of the world. 
So, in the twenty-first century, we have to consider all of 
these elements that have become neighbors of terrorism and of 
international organized crime and drug trafficking, and we have 
to have a strategy to deal with those.  So let me outline for you 
what we have done and what I think we need to continue to do in 
terms of dealing with these kinds of issues.  And, by the way, 
since I’m at a law school I’ll say that one of the interesting 
lessons I learned in the last four years is how pivotal legal 
doctrine and legal authority is to a strategy for addressing all of 
these problems. 
It might surprise you—it certainly surprised me—that war 
fighting is now increasingly a matter that involves legal advice.  
You can argue we’ve overly legalized the war fighting, but 
whether that’s true or not, it’s a matter of fact that more and 
more commanders in the field, whether they’re in the intelligence 
business or the military business, look to the legal authorities to 
determine what they can do and what they can’t do.  One thing 
that’s been a little bit challenging is that the legal authorities of 
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the twentieth century do not necessarily find themselves 
configured for the twenty-first century.  Again, that bifurcated 
idea that you’re either in a war between states or in a 
criminal/domestic-domestic/criminal effort, doesn’t work 
anymore, particularly when you can have networks that can 
bring to bear the destructive force that used to be reserved only 
for the most powerful nation states.  So all the strategic things 
I’m going to talk about now have real implications for the legal 
framework in which we operate, both domestically and overseas. 
So what are the things we need to do, from a strategic sense, 
to deal with this global problem of terrorism and organized 
crime?  Well, the first thing we need to deal with is the issue of 
ungoverned space.  We’ve known for some time, and it’s been 
openly discussed, that parts of the frontier area of Pakistan, in 
Waziristan, and across the border in Afghanistan, have become 
safe havens for terrorists.  These are the places where recruits 
are brought, indoctrinated, trained, armed, and ultimately given 
the tools to go back to their home countries and carry out 
terrorist attacks. 
What I think has emerged publicly more recently is that it’s 
not just Pakistan and Afghanistan; Somalia, which is virtually 
ungoverned, has become a haven not only for terrorist groups 
that recruit from the West, but also for pirate groups, which is 
another species of international organized criminal activity.  
Yemen is now much more in the news because of what happened 
on December twenty-fifth, and I think people are now aware that 
there are parts of Yemen that are not firmly under the control of 
the central government.  We’re beginning to see this phenomenon 
of ungoverned space in North Africa, and even in certain parts of 
South America, where you have very weak governments that 
don’t necessarily have control over the entirety of their physical 
domain. 
How do you deal with this issue?  Obviously, in the first 
instance, we want to enable central governments to exert the 
control and accept the responsibility they have for the business 
that goes on in their own borders.  It is not acceptable to me, for 
example, for a country to say, when there’s a platform for attacks 
within its borders, “That’s not my problem.  I can’t do anything 
about it;” because, just as your neighbor who allows people to 
come into his territory and lob fireballs into your backyard, they 
can’t simply evade the responsibility.  So every country has a 
global responsibility to make sure its space is not a platform to 
leverage attacks against its neighbor or someone on the other 
side of the globe. 
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That means we need to think about what we can do to help 
central governments, and in many ways perhaps to compel them 
to accept responsibility for ungoverned space.  In the first 
instance, it means providing them with the tools, if they’re 
willing to use them.  But in some instances it may mean the 
ability of the international community, or even individual 
nations, to take defensive steps against terrorist groups that are 
lodged in territory of other countries, if the country that has the 
authority refuses to exercise it.  I think you see an example of 
this phenomenon in what the current administration has, I 
think, pretty openly acknowledged—the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicle strikes against individuals in parts of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  That is a manifestation of this principle.  I believe 
it’s lawful, but I will tell you, you could probably get a debate 
about this from some people in Europe, and that’s one of those 
areas where, again, we need to do some serious thinking about 
what the legal authorities are in the case of ungoverned space. 
A second element of the strategy is to look at those elements 
that enable the movement of terrorists and criminals around the 
world.  I’ve talked about this a couple of times already: the ability 
to travel, the ability to finance globally, and the ability to 
communicate globally.  You can only fight a network with a 
network.  The way you fight a network is to find the weak points 
that bring your opposing network together.  That explains a lot of 
what we’ve done in the last eight or nine years to deal with 
terrorism.  I think these are tactics, frankly, that are also useful 
against the international organized crime.  One thing we’ve done 
is focused on finance.  We have used the leverage the United 
States Government has to put certain financial institutions on 
what is, in effect, a black list that says we will not deal with 
them, and nobody who deals with us can deal with them.  That’s 
a way of crippling the flow of money to terrorist groups and to 
other groups that threaten the security of the United States and 
its allies. 
On communications, our capability to intercept commun-
ications, and to learn from those communications what our 
enemies are planning, is a critical element of the strategy.  It 
leverages that which is their strength into their weakness.  It’s 
one of the reasons that the most sensitive communications by 
terrorists are now often conveyed in the most primitive ways, 
because the fact is, the hardest kind of communication to 
intercept is that which one person carries on foot to another 
person, whispers in that second person’s ear, and then it goes on 
like a game of telephone.  So the ability to use our commun-
ications capabilities to frustrate theirs is very important. 
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A third element, and this is one we made a lot of progress on, 
is to focus on the issue of travel by terrorists or criminals.  In this 
modern world where people have the ability to forge documents, 
the kind of travel security measures we had in the 1990s are 
simply insufficient to do the job of protecting our country, or any 
other country.  So, when dealing with travel, we focused on three 
elements.  How do we first secure documents to make them more 
robust?  How do we make sure people can’t use phony documents 
as weapons to get into the country and carry out attacks?  The 
9/11 Commission focused on these kinds of phony documents as a 
tool for terrorism.  It’s one of the reasons we strengthened and 
embedded chips in our travel documents.  It’s one of the reasons 
that we closed some of the loopholes that allowed people to cross 
our land borders using a wide variety of very insecure documents 
and forced them to use passports, or passport cards, or a small 
number of very similar secure documents. 
A second element is recognizing that, even with good 
document security and watch lists, there are a lot of people out 
there who are terrorists whom we don’t know about.  We have no 
idea what their names are.  We don’t have them on a watch list 
because, unlike the fellow on December twenty-fifth, their father 
didn’t come in and give him up.  How do we detect those people?  
Well, one of the things we do is we find out a little bit about their 
behavior, what their biography is.  Some of the commercial data 
which the airlines use in order to manage their own passenger 
flow and their frequent flyer programs and things of that sort, 
turns out to be very valuable in terms of giving us the ability to 
see whether a previously unknown terrorist is actually connected 
to someone whom we know to be a terrorist. 
We once did as an exercise, a couple of years ago, an analysis 
going back to 9/11.  We asked ourselves, if we had in September 
2001 the kind of commercial information we now obtain from the 
airlines, could we have connected the dots among the terrorists?  
I think the answer is, with the exception of maybe two or three, 
we would have seen them all connected.  They would have had a 
common paymaster who paid for the tickets.  They would have 
had a common number that was used as a contact number.  And, 
had we seen that, and knowing that a couple of those people were 
on a watch list, that would have very rapidly given us the 
capability to identify, I think, fifteen out of the nineteen as 
potential threats.  To put it another way, the tools we now have 
in terms of people’s biography give us an ability to stop the kind 
of thing that occurred on September 11, 2001, provided we’re 
willing to use them. 
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A third enormous capability is the use of biometrics—
fingerprints.  Fingerprints are familiar to everybody from things 
like crime scene investigation.  They’ve been a great law 
enforcement tool.  They’re also a terrific tool for protecting us in 
terms of travelers.  For some years now, we’ve used fingerprints 
that we collect from all non-Americans who come into the U.S. 
through our airports.  We’ve used them to match people against 
databases that we have of foreign fingerprints so that if someone, 
for example, came in with a passport and a particular name, we 
got their fingerprints.  Let’s say we said, “You can’t come in.”  A 
year later they come back with their passport with a different 
name, we have them put their fingerprints on the reader.  It 
shows that they have now changed their identity.  That tells us 
something we would not have known but for the fingerprinting. 
But, even more interesting, we are now in the process of 
collecting latent fingerprints from around the world, whether it’s 
in Iraq or Afghanistan, battlefields or safe houses.  These are the 
residual fingerprints of people who have been in training camps 
or in safe houses or in other places where mayhem is being 
planned or carried out.  By using those “latents” and putting 
them in a database, we can run the fingerprints of people who 
come into the country, or people who want to get a visa, against 
that database.  We may not know the person’s name, but we’re 
going to know there’s something about where they’ve been that 
certainly raises a question.  I’ll give you two concrete examples of 
how this works.  First, soon after we put that program into effect, 
someone in another country came to get a visa to come to the 
U.S.  We got their ten fingerprints.  We ran them against the 
database, and we discovered that one of the fingerprints matched 
the fingerprint that had been taken off a piece of paper found in 
an apartment in Europe that had been the site for some bomb 
building for one of the plots that someone tried to carry out in the 
last several years. 
Now it turns out there was actually an innocent explanation 
for why that fingerprint was there.  You know, people can be in 
and out of an apartment.  Sometimes someone would’ve been 
there afterwards and not at the time the bomb was being built.  
But that’s at least the kind of thing you want to know to ask the 
question.  It may be in the end, when you ask the question, that 
the answer you get exculpates the traveler.  But I’d sure rather 
know and ask the question than not know and find out that the 
guy coming in to the country used to be working in a bomb 
factory. 
In a different example, we had a fellow in 2004 or 2005 who 
came into O’Hare Airport.  He was turned away by the immi-
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gration official who was on duty that day, but we captured his 
fingerprints.  We discovered a couple of years later, when we ran 
through his fingerprints again, that the fingerprints were on the 
steering wheel of a truck bomb that was detonated in Baghdad.  
That told us that this individual, who had been turned away, 
became a suicide bomber two years later.  So the ability to use 
biometrics is a huge capability, in terms of dealing with global 
travel, which is such a major part of global terrorism and 
organized crime. 
Finally, let me conclude by saying the last element of the 
strategy is increasing the security of our own physical borders, 
whether it’s our maritime borders or our land borders.  The fact 
is, we have very large borders—thousands of miles.  It is 
demanding and difficult to deal with the traffic that comes across 
the borders.  There’s a lot more to be done, but we’ve at least 
made significant progress.  Up to now terrorists seem, generally 
speaking, to prefer to travel by air and come through ports of 
entry rather than to sneak across the border, but I wouldn’t want 
to count on that always being the case.  And, certainly, I wouldn’t 
want to assume that in five years, depending on how things go in 
Mexico, that we’re not going to begin to see some movement of 
terrorists across that border, which is why I think it’s important 
that we continue to build on the progress we’ve made with 
fencing, doubling the border patrol, and building technology, in 
order to increase the ability to have control over our southern 
border. 
This is probably not a really optimistic speech, but I do think 
it tells us a couple of interesting things.  First of all, the kind of 
war we fight in the future is going to look an awful lot like what 
we’ve done with respect to international organized crime.  In fact, 
the idea that you can separate these things into two domains is 
probably not realistic anymore.  We’re going to see a lot of 
movement back and forth.  I like to say that the latter part of the 
twentieth century was a kind of digital age of dealing with these 
issues because it was binary.  It was either war, which was dealt 
with by military, or it was crime, which was dealt with by law 
enforcement.  But we’re now in what we call a quantum age of 
dealing with security threats, where the same security threat can 
be a law enforcement issue and a military issue at the same time.  
The enemies of our safety and security move back and forth 
simultaneously across the whole spectrum, and therefore require 
us to be able to engage across the whole spectrum. 
The second thing, which I think is probably pertinent to this 
audience, is this means more work for lawyers.  I don’t mean just 
prosecutors and defense attorneys.  I mean thinking of what it 
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means in our legal regime to deal with this very fluid situation.  
To ask questions about what our authority is to protect ourselves 
in ungoverned space overseas.  What are the limits of what we 
should collect and shouldn’t collect from people who are traveling 
in order to make sure that we’re not putting our country in 
jeopardy?  These are very challenging legal issues, and they 
require a lot of novel and out-of-the-box thinking.  I don’t know if 
it pays well, but it certainly provides a lot of opportunity for 
lawyers to do their work and apply their trade.  And I suspect 
that a fair number of people in this room will, in one way or 
another, be engaged in doing this kind of work in the years to 
come. 
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